Housing & Public Infrastructure: UDF Party Manifesto 2026

Pillar 01 · Housing

A four-pronged approach to housing

The United Democratic Front Party submits that housing is a means of giving back dignity, a tool for community-based economic growth and skills development, and an ultimate vehicle for social change. We will endeavour to achieve this using a four-pronged approach.

Self-help schemes

Municipalities will provide serviced plots of land, each measuring at least 200 m², equipped with essential infrastructure such as water, sanitation and electricity. The initiative will be financed through the R2-billion allocation from national government, or where feasible, self-funded by municipalities under their current budgets.

Construction carried out directly by the beneficiaries themselves, following the self-help model
Housing funds released in stages, aligned with construction progress, to ensure accountability and support incremental building
Empowers families to take ownership of their housing development, promotes cost efficiency and fosters community-driven growth

Transfer of municipal flats & courts

We will champion the transfer of ownership to all residents living in City of Cape Town council flats and courts, subject to certain occupancy conditions, aiming to provide redress and restore dignity to the people of Cape Town.

Creates skills, wealth and economic leverage for small businesses operating from these communities
The municipality must repair the flats before such transfer takes place
Subject to further conditions, such as a period responsible for latent defects

RDP build structures

We submit that the current plans and implementations should continue, and that future planning be based on self-help.

Affordable housing in high-opportunity areas

We will prioritise affordable housing in the inner city, the Atlantic Seaboard, the Southern Suburbs, transport corridors, and all areas with high job density.

Inclusionary housing will be mandatory in all major developments

Pillar 02 · Infrastructure development

Foundational principles for Cape Town's infrastructure

Cape Town's infrastructure is the backbone of its social, economic and environmental future. Essential services must remain under democratic control and must not be outsourced to private operators whose incentives diverge from the public interest.

Public ownership of essential services

Public ownership and public operation of all infrastructure essential to life, dignity and economic participation: water, sanitation, electricity distribution, waste management, stormwater systems, public transport governance and core digital infrastructure.

Democratic accountability

Infrastructure decisions must be transparent, subject to council oversight and open to public participation. Accountability cannot be delegated to private boards whose primary duty is shareholder return.

Long-term public value

Infrastructure must be evaluated on long-term social, environmental and economic value, not short-term cost-cutting or budget relief.

Internal capacity building

The City must invest in engineering, planning, legal, IT and operational skills internally. Outsourcing must never become structural dependence.

Equity and universal access

Infrastructure must reduce inequality and guarantee access for historically marginalised communities. Market-driven models cannot achieve this alone.

The public-first boundary

What must never be outsourced in Cape Town

Drawing on European and Chinese evidence and the nature of essential services, the following functions must remain strictly public.

Water supply & sanitation

Bulk water resource planning
Treatment plant operation
Distribution network management
Metering and billing policy
Tariff-setting authority

Water is a human right; outsourcing leads to tariff inflation, weak transparency and costly insourcing later.

Electricity distribution & grid control

Ownership and operation of distribution networks
Grid expansion planning
Renewable integration strategy

Grid control is central to energy security and climate policy.

Public transport governance

Route planning
Fare policy
Ticketing systems
Integration across modes

Fragmented private operations undermine coherent mobility systems.

Waste management (strategic core)

Landfill ownership
Environmental monitoring
City-wide waste strategy

Waste management is an essential public service and a core municipal responsibility: long-term environmental protection, public health and control of critical public assets must not be outsourced.

Urban planning & regulatory functions

Zoning
Building control
Environmental approvals

These functions involve the exercise of public regulatory power and decisions that affect property rights, development, the environment and the public interest.

Core IT systems & data governance

Billing databases
Cadastral systems
Cybersecurity
Digital identity systems

These functions involve critical municipal data, public assets, financial information and the digital security of residents.

Limited, reversible, non-core

What can be outsourced and the maximum percentage

20–30%Maximum outsourced share of any essential service's total expenditure

70–80%Must remain public: strategic control, core operations and asset ownership

>30%The level at which European cities faced severe difficulty and high cost when insourcing again

Appropriate outsourcing areas

Specialised engineering studies
Short-term technical maintenance
Construction (but not ownership or operation)
Non-core support services (cleaning, catering)
Innovation pilots with sunset clauses

Disadvantages of outsourcing

Loss of public control: private operators prioritise profit, not public value
Higher long-term costs: tariffs and user fees often increase under private management
Contractual lock-in: long-term PPPs restrict policy flexibility and adaptation
Erosion of municipal capacity: skills decline when core functions are outsourced
Transparency problems: private firms treat operational data as proprietary
Labour precarity: lower wages and weaker labour protections
High cost of insourcing: buy-back costs, litigation, rebuilding internal teams, transition risks

Empirical lessons

Why outsourcing failed abroad

European cities provide the strongest empirical evidence on outsourcing failures: many later reversed outsourcing through re-municipalisation, bringing services back in-house. China's PPP boom tells the same story at scale.

Water services: Paris, Berlin and others

Paris (Eau de Paris) ended private concessions with Veolia and Suez after decades of outsourcing: tariffs increased faster under private operators, cost structures lacked transparency, investment prioritised profit over long-term maintenance, and public oversight was weak due to information asymmetry.

Berlin Water partially privatised, then bought back private shares at a cost of €618 million due to rising tariffs, public dissatisfaction and contractual lock-in that limited policy flexibility. Paris incurred substantial restructuring costs to rebuild internal capacity lost during outsourcing.

Energy utilities: Hamburg, Stuttgart

More than 280 German municipalities re-municipalised energy grids between 2005 and 2020. Private operators underinvested in local networks; climate and social goals were not aligned with profit-driven models; municipalities struggled to enforce public-interest obligations.

Cities faced high concession buy-back costs, litigation over contract termination, and the need to rebuild technical teams that had been hollowed out.

Transport PPP failures: UK and Spain

UK rail outsourcing resulted in chronic underinvestment, safety failures and the eventual renationalisation of several lines. Spanish toll-road PPPs collapsed financially, requiring state bailouts. Governments absorbed billions in liabilities after private operators failed.

China's PPP boom: rapid expansion, high failure

Since 2014 China aggressively promoted PPPs to relieve local government debt; empirical analysis of 2014–2020 projects shows a high failure and termination rate. Rapid, policy-driven expansion of outsourcing without strong institutional safeguards leads to systemic project failure.

Large, complex government structures showed higher failure rates; weak business environments for private capital magnified risk. Analysis of over 12,000 PPP projects shows purely private partners had higher abnormal termination rates, while state-owned enterprise involvement created more stability in socially critical sectors.

PPP contracts often created hidden obligations (minimum revenue guarantees, availability payments) that later strained municipal budgets. Outsourcing does not remove fiscal risk; it repackages it, making it harder to see and manage.

“China's and European experience show that outsourcing essential infrastructure through PPPs, without strong institutions, clear public interest safeguards and robust fiscal capacity, leads to high failure rates, hidden debt and costly reversals.” Direct takeaway for Cape Town

Implementation commitments

How Cape Town will deliver a public-first model

Adopt a public-first infrastructure policy

Codify non-outsourcing rules in municipal bylaws.

Audit all existing outsourced contracts

Identify high-risk areas and develop a phased insourcing plan.

Rebuild internal capacity

Invest in municipal engineering, planning, IT and operations.

Design reversible contracts

Short-term, performance-based, with clear exit clauses.

Institutionalise public participation

Ensure historically disadvantaged communities shape infrastructure priorities.

Prioritise equity and climate resilience

Use public control to direct investment to underserved areas.

“Cape Town must build infrastructure that is publicly owned, publicly controlled and publicly accountable, addressing historical neglect. A public-first model is the only sustainable path to equitable, resilient and democratic services.” Conclusion, Infrastructure Manifesto

Housing & public infrastructure